Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 3

1-15-1993

Psychotherapist and Patient in the California Supreme Court:
Ground Lost and Ground Regained
Stanley Mosk

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons,
Evidence Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the State
and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stanley Mosk Psychotherapist and Patient in the California Supreme Court: Ground Lost and Ground
Regained, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 2 (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol20/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Psychotherapist and Patient in the
California Supreme Court:
Ground Lost and Ground Regained
Stanley Mosk*
California statutory law provides a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
under which communications between a patient and his psychotherapist are protected from disclosure.' There is an exception to this
privilege when the patient is dangerous to himself or others.' Both the
privilege and the exception are clear. In two recent decisions, however,
a bare msjority of the California Supreme Court misconstrued the pertinent statutory provisions with mischievous effect.' In a more recent
decision, a unanimous court commenced the labor of correcting its own
errors.4 Whether the court will complete the task remains to be seen.
I.

THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

AND THE "DANGEROUS PATIENT" EXCEPTION

* Justice of the California Supreme Court. I am indebted to Dennis Peter Maio,
J.D., Yale Law School, 1981, for his work on this Article.
1. CAL EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1993). See infra text accompanying note 6
for relevant portion of section 1014. All further references to "the Code" are to the
California Evidence Code.
2. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966). See iqfra text accompanying notes 8-9 for
relevant portions of section 1024.
3. People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 887
(1992); People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127 (Cal.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990).
In Wharton, Chief Justice Lucas' majority opinion commanded only four votes.
Wharton, 809 P.2d at 299-342. Justice Mosk dissented. Id. at 342-45 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard filed a separate dissent, in which Justice Kennard concurred.
Id. at 345-51 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Likewise, in Clark, the majority comprised only four justices. Clark, 789 P.2d at
134-64. Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Kaufman each filed concurring and dissenting
opinions. Id. at 164-66 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 166-68 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 168-77 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
4. Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992).

In 1965, the California Legislature enacted the California Evidence
Code.' Section 1014 codifies the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
which provides, in relevant part, that "the patient... has a privilege to
refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist."' Section
1012 defines "confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist" as
information, including information obtained by an examination of the patient,
transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to
further the interest of the patient in the consultation, or those to whom disclosure
is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the psychotherapist is consulted, and includes a
diagnosis made and the advice given by the psychotherapist in the course of that

relationship.!

Section 1024 sets forth the so-called "dangerous patient" exception.'
Pursuant to this exception, there is no privilege as to an otherwise protected communication "if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to
believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be
dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that
disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened
danger."
Hl.
A.

GROUND LOST: PEOPLE V. CLARK AND
PEOPLE V. WHARTON

People v. Clark

In People v. Clark, a deeply divided California Supreme Court affimed a judgment of death." The court produced four opinions: a ma-

5. Cobey-Song Evidence Act, ch. 299, § 2. 1965 Cal. Stat. 1297, 1297-1356 (codified
as CAL EViD. CODE).
6. CAL EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1993). See generally CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 101-05 (3d ed. 1984); 2 B. WIrrIN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses §§ 1201-1204 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1992).
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1012 (West Supp. 1993).
8. CAL EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
9. Id. Additionally, upon maling the determination that the patient is "dangerous,"
the psychotherapist has an affirmative duty to warn all potential victims of the perceived danger. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976). See
generally Violet Lee, Comment, The Dangerous Patient Exception and the Duty to
Warn.. Creation of a Dangerous Precedent?, 9 U.C. DAvis L REv. 549 (1976).
10. 789 P.2d 127 (Cal.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990).
11. Id. at 164. Clark was convicted by jury of rape, arson, first degree murder,
and two counts of attempted second degree murder. Il. at 134-35. After the superior
court imposed the death penalty, the California Supreme Court reviewed the case on
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jority opinion commanding a bare four votes' and three separate concurring and dissenting opinions.'3
The Clark majority considered the defendant's claim that the superior
court's admission into evidence of certain threatening communications
assertedly protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege amounted to
prejudicial error." They rejected the point, holding that "even if erroneously admitted, the evidence was not prejudicial.""
The Clark majority further held that the threatening communications
were not protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege because they
were properly revealed to the potential victim prior to trial, and thus
were no longer confidential. 6 Contrary to its own language, the Clark
majority effectively narrowed the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
erroneously fabricating a novel "requirement" that in order to be protected, a communication must be and remain "confidential." 7 The court
noted that "[a] psychotherapist has a professional duty to maintain the
confidential character of communications made to him by his patient
during the course of the relationship, but when it is necessary to disclose
confidential information to avert danger to others the therapist must do so."'

automatic appeal. Id at 134. On review, Clark argued that he did not possess the

requisite intent to kill. Id.
12. Id. at 134-64. Justice Eagleson authored the majority opinion, in which Chief
Justice Lucas and Justices-Panelli and Kennard concurred. Id.
13. Id. at 164-66 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); id at 166-68 (Broussard, J.,

concurring and dissenting; Mosk, J., concurring therein); id. at 168-77 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
14. Id. at 150-54. During an interview with Dr. Weinberger, a court appointed psychologist, the defendant expressed his desire to kill his ex-therapist's brother. Id. at

149. Weinberger was subsequently allowed to testify as to these threats. Id. at 151.
The defendant contended that his statements to Weinberger were confidential, and
thus protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Ld.
15. Id. at 153. The court reasoned that the defendant's statements to Weinberger
were such a "minor aspect of the overwhelming evidence of aggravating factors
reflected in the circumstances of the crime itself" that a jury could not have reasonably reached a different verdict even if the evidence had been excluded. Id, at 15354.
16. Id. at 151.

17. See id. at 150-54 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 151 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal.
1976)). In Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court dealt generally with the
psychotherapist's duty under the common law "to use reasonable care to protect the
intended victim" of a patient who "presents a serious danger of violence." Tarasoff,
551 P.2d at 340.
The Tarasoff court held that

According to the Clark majority, the purpose underlying Evidence
Code section 1014 "is not to prevent the use of a defendant's statements
against him in legal proceedings. It exists to prevent the unnecessary

disclosure of statements made in confidence in the course of a privileged
communication with a therapist and thereby to facilitate treatment."'
However, the court also noted that if the statements have been revealed
to third persons in a communication that is not itself privileged, then
they are no longer confidential.'
The Clark majority continued:
The question is not whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been waived
or the excepion that would permit compelled disclosure in a legal proceeding
applies, but whether the privilege may be claimed at all once the communication
is no longer confidential .... [O]nce the communication has lost its confidential
status, [it becomes Irrelevant] whether the psychotherapist 'reasonably believes'
that revelation of the communication is necessary."

The court concluded that "[t]he reason for the privilege-protecting the
patient's right to privacy and promoting the therapeutic relation-

ship-and thus the privilege itself, disappear once the communication is

[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the
therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of
the case. Thus It may call for him to warn the intended victim or others
likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
The Tarusoff court further held that
the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the
threatened danger.
Id. at 347. See genemUy 2 B. WmIN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 1212 (3d ed.
1986 & Supp. 1992) (discussing Tarasofl); 6 B. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CAUORNIA LAW,
Torts §§ 860-61 (3d ed 1986 & Supp. 1992).
19. Ctai*, 789 P.2d at 151 (citing Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346-47).
20. I& But cf. Roberts v. Superior Court 508 P.2d 309, 316 (Cal. 1973) (finding
that privilege had not been waived by disclosure when a psychotherapist exchanged
patient's records with other physicians after patient had actively asserted privilege).
See generally Jonathan Baumoel, Comment, The Beginning of the End for the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 60 U. CIN. L REv. 797, 798 (1992) (arguing that "exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege when a patient's confidential communications are revealed to a third party is justified only when a significant government
interest outweighs the patient's privacy interest").
21. Clark, 789 P.2d at 151 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966)).
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no longer confidential."'
B.

People v. Wharton

One year later, in People v. Wharton,' a deeply divided California Supreme Court once again affirmed a judgment of death.' In Wharton, the
court produced three opinions: a majority opinion commanding a bare
four votes' and two separate dissenting opinions.'
The Wharton majority considered the defendant's claim that the superior court's admission into evidence of certain communications
assertedly protected by the psychotherapist- patient privilege amounted
to prejudicial error.' While the majority rejected the point,' the other
three Justices found the claim to be meritorious.' In the course of its
discussion, the Wharton majority effectively broadened the "dangerous
patient" exception beyond its terms,' even though it expressly recognized its "obligation" to construe the exception "narrowly."'
As noted, a communication otherwise protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege comes within the "dangerous patient" exception if, at the time the privilege is claimed, there is reasonable cause for
the psychotherapist to believe that the patient is dangerous and that

22. Id.
23. 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 887 (1992).
24. Id. at 342.
25. Id. at 299-342. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Id.
26. Id. at 34245 (Mosk, J., dissenting); id. at 345-51 (Broussard, J., dissenting;
Kennard, J., concurring therein).
27. Id. at 304-14. Prior to committing the murder, the defendant had told both of
his therapists that he planned to injure the victim. Id. at 304-06. Both therapists
warned the eventual victim, and subsequently testified at trial as to the defendant's
threatening statements. Id. The defendant's primary argument on review was that the
dangerous patient exception should not apply to allow the therapists to testify regarding the warnings given to the victim. Id. at 307-08. The defendant reasoned that the
purpose of the dangerous patient exception is to avert danger to would-be victims
and, thus, would not be relevant once the harm to the victim has occurred. Id. at
308.
28. Id. at 314.
29. Id. at '344-45 (Mosk, J., dissenting); id. at 345-51 (Broussard, J., dissenting;
Kennard, J., concurring therein).
30. In addition, the Wharton majority followed C/ark with its narrowing of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 312-13 (citing People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127,
151-54 (Cal.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990).
31. Id. at 308, 313.

disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened
harm. -"
First, the Wharton majority erroneously construed the "dangerous
patient" exception so as to effectively abolish the crucial requirement
that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent threatened
harm.' This requirement is plain in both the statutory language' and
the legislative history,' and compels the conclusion that the exception
does not apply when disclosure is not needed to forestall future injury,
as when some means other than disclosure is available, or when the
injury has already been inflicted.'2
Second, the Wharton majority erroneously held that the "dangerous
patient" exception extends to any and all communications that "trigger"
the requisite "reasonable cause."' This holding turns the exception on
its head. Contrary to the statutory language and the legislative history,"2
32. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976); see also
supra note 18 and accompanying text.
33. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 308-09.
34. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1012, 1014, 1024 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993). For the
relevant portions of these statutory sections, see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying
text.
35. See generally Wharton, 809 P.2d at 344-45 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
36. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). At one point in its opinion, the Wharton majority
stated that if the "dangerous patient" exception is read to require that disclosure of
the communication is necessary to prevent threatened harm, "a dangerous patient
could regain the protection of the privilege by simply killing his victim, certainly an
absurd result." Id. at 308 (citing People v. Morris, 756 P.2d 843, 851 (Cal. 1988)). At
another point, the majority stated, in similar fashion, that such a reading
would inevitably lead to absurd results. For example, under [this] interpretation, a therapist could never testify that his or her patient was presently
dangerous to another person in the following circumstances: (1) where the
patient was in custody at the time of trial, (2) where the potential victim had
moved and the patient did not know where the victim currently lived, (3)
where the potential victim lived in another state or country, or (4) ...
where the victim had been killed by the time of trial.

Id. at 309 n.5.
The "absurdity" perceived by the justices of the Wharton majority merely reflects
their own view that the scheme enacted by the California Legislature is unwise. But, of
course, it matters not that they are apparently displeased with the psychotherapist-patient privilege as codified in California Evidence Code section 1014, which
authorizes the patient to exclude even the most highly relevant communication from
any and all legal proceedings. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1993). Nor does
it matter that they are apparently displeased with the "dangerous patient" exception as
codified in California Evidence Code section 1024, which is applicable only when disclosure of the communication is needed to forestall future injury. See CAL EVID. CODE
§ 1024 (West 1966). It may be noted in passing that, contrary to the Wharton
majority's misunderstanding, although a psychotherapist cannot always disclose protected communications, he can always testify that his patient is dangerous.
37. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 313, 314. See id. at 308.
38. See generally id. at 344-45 (Mosk J., dissenting) (discus.ng legislative history
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disclosure is potentially allowed for each and every communication, as
opposed to only the specific communication which is needed to forestall
future injury.39

m.

GROUND REGAINED: MENENDEZ V. SUPERIOR
COURT

In Menendez v. Superior Court°--a notorious case charging two
brothers in a wealthy and prominent Beverly Hills family with the capital
murder of their parents-the California Supreme Court again considered
an argument for the exclusion of evidence pursuant to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege." The superior court ruled against the
point in its entirety' and, on petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition, the court of appeal sustained the ruling.' On petition for review,
however, the supreme court disagreed, determining that the ruling was
partly unsound.' In Menendez, as will appear, a unanimous supreme
court almost totally succeeded in reestablishing, within its proper scope,
both the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the "dangerous patient"
exception.'
Although generally adhering to Wharton (unsurprisingly, in view of
stare decisis and the fact that no party called for reconsideration) the
court in Menendez effectively corrected one of the Wharton majority's
errors. It expressly held that "an otherwise protected communication"
comes within the "dangerous patient" exception if "there is reasonable
cause for the psychotherapist to believe that (1) the patient is dangerous
and (2) disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent any
harm."' The court thereby made it clear that the exception does not
extend to any and all communications that may be deemed to "trigger"

and the purpose of California's psychotherapist-patient privilege).
39. This is because each and every communication bears in some way on
dangerousness of the patient. See id. at 313-14.
40. 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J., authoring the opinion of the court).
41. Id, at 788-89. During an investigation, the police seized three audiotapes
taining information relating to the killings from the office of the defendants'
chotherapist. Ld.at 788. The defendants argued that the tapes were inadmissable
suant to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 789.

the

conpsypur-

42. Id. at 790.
43. Id. at 792.
44. Id. at 793.
45. See id. at 793-99.
46. ld. at 794 (citing People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290, 306-14 (Cal. 1991), cert.

denied, 112 S. Ct 887 (1992).

the requisite "reasonable cause," but only to the specific communication
be disclosed by the psychotherapist in fulfillment of his duty to
that must
4
warn.

By contrast, the court in Menendez all but totally disapproved of
Clark.8 Its criticism, to be sure, was aimed against the superior court's
"reading" of Clark, which was altogether faithful to the opinion of the
Clark majority, rather than against Clark itself.' Nevertheless, the criticism hit its mark.
At the outset, the court declared that, as to the proposition that the
psychotherapist-patient "privilege requires the communication to be and
remain 'confidential[,]' [tihe law is otherwise."' The court observed that
"[t]he privilege can cover a communication that was never, in fact,
'confidential'-so long as it was made in confidence."" The court noted
that "[s]imilarly, the privilege can cover a communication that has lost its
'confidential' status."' The court rejected any implication that
the privilege is not intended to enable the patient to prevent disclosure in legal
proceedings. To be sure, the purpose is not to grant him power to bar evidence
for its own sake. But the purpose is indeed to grant him power to bar evidence-in order to protect his right to privacy and promote the psychotherapeutic

relationship."
The court also rejected any suggestion that
the patient's privacy is breached and the psychotherapeutic relationship destroyed
as soon as any communication loses its 'confidential' status in any degree. Such a
proposition is unsupported. For example, if the communication is insignificant in
content or the disclosure is narrow in scope, the patient's privacy may be implicated only slightly. Also, and perhaps more important, the psychotherapeutic relationship may survive even the broadest disclosure of the most substantial communication-much as other relationships do. That seems especially true when, as
here, the patient whose communication is disclosed is unaware of the fact.'

Finally, the court made clear that Clark was internally inconsistent:
In Roberts v. Superior Court,... we held that only the patient has the power to

47. ld. at 796. "(TJhe public policy favoring protection of the confidential character
of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others.'" Id. (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of the
Univ., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976)).
48. Id. at 793-99.
49. See id. at 793.
50. Id.
51. ld."The communication need only comprise 'information... transmitted between a patient and his psychotherapist in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information'
to no 'outside' third person." I& (quoting CAL EVID. CODE § 1012 (West Supp. 1966)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 794.
54. Id.

Psychotherpist-PatientPrivilege
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waive the privilege in any part. A fortiori, only the patient has the power to cause
the privilege to go out of existence in its entirety. By its citation to Roberts, Clark
impliedly accepts the patient's control of waiver of the privilege. But inexplicably,... Clark... all but expressly reject(s] the patient's control of the privilege's
very existence."

In a word, after Menendez, practically nothing remains of Clark beyond a memory of the shadow it had cast on the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The analysis set out in the preceding section shows that the California
Supreme Court has corrected its own errors so far as Clark is concerned.
In Menendez, the court squarely repudiated the Clark majority's erroneous "requirement" that a communication must be and remain "confidential" in order to come within the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 7

55. Id. (citing People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 151 (Cal.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
442 (1990); Roberts v. Superior Ct., 508 P.2d 309, 316 (Cal. 1973)). In passing, the
following point bears emphasis. Contrary to the Clark majority's apparent understanding, the "dangerous patient" exception and the rule of Tarasoff do not operate in the
same sphere. Quite the opposite. As noted, Tarasoff defines the psychotherapist's
duty under the common law "to use reasonable care" in the world at large "to protect the Intended victim" of a patient who "presents a serious danger of violence."
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). By contrast, the exception removes the patient's authorization under the California Evidence Code to
exclude an otherwise protected communication from a legal proceeding if there is
reasonable cause for the psychotherapist to believe that the patient is dangerous and
that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent threatened harm. See
CAL EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1992).
56. Of, course, the fact that the Wharton majority followed Clark, see supra note
30, means nothing now that Clark itself is no longer vital.
57. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. All that survives of Clark is
what Menendez labeled its "holding": "[W]hen a psychotherapist discloses a patient's
threat to the patient's intended victim in a so-called 'Tarasoff warning,' the disclosed
threat is not covered by the privilege." Menendez, 834 P.2d at 793 (citations omitted).
Plainly, the Clark "holding" is in actuality obiter dictum. It is unnecessary to the
conclusion that "even if erroneously admitted, the evidence [of the disclosed threat)
was not prejudicial." Clark, 789 P.2d at 153. Menendez's contrary labeling is itself no
more than dictum. See Menendez, 834 P.2d at 793.
Just as plainly, the Clark "holding" is unsound and hence falls of its own
weight. First, it is simply an instance of the erroneous "confidentiality requirement"
rejected in Menendez. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text. Certainly, the
Clark "holding" cannot be treated as a mere restatement of the "dangerous patient"
exception, seeing that it purportedly renders the exception "irrelevant." See Clark, 789
P.2d at 151. Second, the Clark "holding" would undermine Tarasoff. As noted, in

Furthermore, the preceding analysis makes a similar showing that the
California Supreme Court has corrected its own errors so far as Wharton
is concerned. In Menendez, the court departed from the Wharton
majority's erroneous holding that the "dangerous patient" exception extends to any and all otherwise protected communications that may be
deemed to "trigger" reasonable cause for psychotherapist's belief in the
dangerousness of the patient and the necessity of disclosure to prevent
threatened harm.'
It remains to be seen whether the court will reject the Wharton
majority's erroneous construction of the "dangerous patient" exception,
which effectively abolished the crucial requirement that disclosure is necessary to prevent harm.' Menendez inspires hope in this regard. But if
the court fails to act, the California Legislature may be expected to intervene. The legislature has manifested its intent to be the only source of
law relating to privilege.' Surely, it will eventually remove the taint that
the Wharton majority has injected.

Tarasoff, the court held that "the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he"
make any disclosures of a communication "necessary to avert danger to others . . .
discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the
fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger." Tarasoff, 551
P.2d at 347 (citation omitted). Under the Clark "holding," the therapist could not
fulfill his obligations. Any disclosure of a communication-no matter how "discreet"
and "private'"-would allow disclosure to all the world on the ground that "the communication has lost its confidential status." Clark, 789 P.2d at 151.
58. Compare Menendez, 834 P.2d at 794 with People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 313, 314

(Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1992).
59. See Wharton, 809 P.2d at 306-14.
60. See CAL EVID. CODE § 911 (West 1966) (setting forth general rule regarding

privileges); Wharton, 809 P.2d at 345 n.2 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

